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THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT AND 
ITS FAILURE TO WORK EFFECTIVELY IN THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
Laurie Aurelia * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cathy Sue and Roger Anunsen are trying to save the mountain 
goat in Olympic National Park in the Pacific N orthwest.1 The moun-
tain goat is in jeopardy there because a recent draft of an environ-
mental impact statement contends that the goats, as non-natives of 
the park, threaten native vegetation.2 The impact statement, drafted 
by park environmentalists, categorizes the mountain goats as pests 
and recommends killing them.3 In their campaign to save the moun-
tain goat, the Anunsens, who consider themselves staunch environ-
mentalists, have found themselves fighting the National Park Serv-
ice, the Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth, among others.4 Their 
battle is progressing through two methods-a local public relations 
campaign to solicit support for their cause-and in courts, by attack-
ing the procedure which has led to the possible mountain goat exter-
mination.5 In particular, the Anunsens say they plan to use the gov-
ernment's "own red tape" to stall institution of the extermination 
policy.6 That red tape includes a suit under the Federal Advisory 
* Editor-in-Chief, 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Rob Carson, Guardians of the Goats, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, June 4,1995, at 1. 
2Id. 
3Id. 
4Id. 
5Id. 
6 Carson, supra note 1, at 1. 
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Committee Act (FACA).7 FACA requires that advisory committees 
like that which drafted the park's environmental impact statement 
conduct their procedures according to prescribed mandates.8 The 
Anunsens plan to sue the government for failing to comply with 
FACA.9 This case illustrates why FACA was originally passed-to 
ensure that before important governmental decisions are made, all 
voices relevant to that decision have a chance to be heard. If an 
advisory committee violates FACA and those voices are not heard, a 
FACA suit is a way for a concerned plaintiff to stall implementation 
of decisions based on advisory committee recommendations. Unfortu-
nately, in many cases, and perhaps in the Anunsens' case, FACA is 
failing to work as Congress originally intended. 
An enormous network of executive branch advisory committees, 
like that which the Anunsens may be battling, has developed within 
the federal government since the days of the New Deal.lO At recent 
count, there are almost eleven hundred advisory committees to the 
executive branch, made up of almost thirty thousand members and 
costing about $144 million each yearY Despite both presidential and 
congressional efforts to regulate these advisory committees, the com-
mittees remain ungoverned, allowing for substantial abuse.12 The lack 
of adequate regulation of advisory committees stems in part from 
statutory construction and in part from current judicial application of 
advisory committee regulations.13 
An advisory committee is established by either the President or an 
executive agency and is made up of a group of experts in a particular 
field. 14 An advisory committee is responsible for providing advice, 
assisting in the creation of legislation or regulations, and establishing 
policy.15 The advice that advisory committees provide to executive 
agencies and to the President covers everything from the space pro-
gram to flue-cured tobacco.16 Executive branch advisory committees 
are particularly prevalent and influential in the environmental con-
7 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1995). 
8Id. 
!l Carson, supra note 1, at 1. 
10 Brad Brown, $144 Million Advice Network, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1995, at A23. 
11 Id. 
12Id. 
1:3 See infra notes 220-36 and accompanying text. 
14 See Brown, supra note 10, at A23. 
15Id. 
16 See id. 
1995] FACA'S ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE 89 
text, where, in the past two decades, policymaking has shifted sub-
stantially from the legislative to the executive branch.17 
While advisory committees provide valuable advice and insight to 
governmental policymakers, advisory committees are largely unac-
counted for in both number and scope, and their procedures and 
activities are often left unchecked.18 In the late 1960s, Congress real-
ized that advisory committees were often dominated by industry 
professionals with a personal agenda, usually not in the interests of 
public health, welfare, or the environment.19 To solve this problem, in 
1972, Congress passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(FACA).20 FACA governs the establishment of advisory committees 
and places numerous procedural mandates on advisory committee 
operations.21 In large part, Congress passed FACA to cut down on 
wasteful and duplicative advisory committees and to open advisory 
committee operations to public scrutiny.22 Congress expected FACA 
to eliminate most of the problems that had been occurring under the 
poorly regulated advisory committee system.23 
Yet, caselaw and commentary indicate that FACA, as a legislative 
cure to advisory committee abuse, has failed in many respects.24 Al-
though FACA provides clear procedural mandates to all advisory 
committees, in most jurisdictions courts have, in effect, refused to 
enforce those mandates.25 From the outset, courts have misconstrued 
the statutory definition of an advisory committee subject to FACA's 
mandates.26 In addition, even in instances of blatant FACA violations, 
plaintiffs bringing suit for such violations have received no remedy in 
17 Kit Gage & Samuel S. Epstein, The Federal Advisory Committee System: An Assessment, 
7 ENVTL. LAW REP. 50001, 50001 (1977); see also Advisory Committees: United States Senate 
Hearings on S. 1637 and S. 1964 Before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, 
Committee on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 346 (1971) (statement of Prof. 
Henry Steck, Dept. of Political Science, State U niv. of New York, College of Cortland, Cortland, 
N.Y.) [hereinafter Steck testimony]. 
18 See Brown, supra note 10, at A23. 
19 See Gage & Epstein, supra note 17, at 5000l. 
2il FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15. 
21Id. 
22 Id.; see also Jerry W. Markham, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 35 U. PI'IT. L. REV. 
557, 557 (1974). 
23 See Markham, supra note 22, at 562-65. 
24 See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1309 (W.D. Wash. 1994); see 
generally Brown, supra note 10. 
25 See, e.g., American Petroleum Institute v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982); Seattle Audubon, 871 F. Supp. at 1309. 
26 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 441 (1989); Food 
Chern. News v. Young, 900 F.2d 328,331 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990). 
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the courtS.27 Courts' failure to enforce FACA often leaves advisory 
committees without any real incentive to comply with FACA's re-
quirements and frustrates Congress's intent in passing FACA. The 
only way to promote the legislative intent behind FACA is either: (1) 
for Congress to amend FACA and clarify any ambiguities; or (2) for 
courts to reevaluate their current definition of an advisory committee 
and to begin providing injunctive relief to plaintiffs complaining of 
FACA violations.28 
This Comment traces the historical need for legislation to govern 
executive branch advisory committees, the subsequent passage of 
FACA and why FACA is not having the effects Congress anticipated. 
Section II explores the historical background ofFACA-in particular, 
the legislation which preceded FACA and the congressional concerns 
that led to FACA's passage. Section III discusses the statutory and 
judicial definitions of an advisory committee subject to FACA's re-
quirements. Section III also examines environmental suits brought 
against executive agencies and the President for advisory committee 
violations of FACA. This section focuses on environmental plaintiffs 
who have used FACA, usually with little success, to attempt to pre-
vent the implementation of regulations or legislation passed on advice 
from committees in violation of FACA. Section IV analyzes potential 
amendments to FACA that would provide clearer guidance to courts 
in their statutory construction and application of FACA. In addition, 
this section discusses the flawed judicial definition of an advisory 
committee, as well as the judicial reluctance to provide injunctive 
relief for FACA violations, both of which frustrate the legislative 
intent of FACA. Finally, this section addresses the need for courts to 
reevaluate their current definition of an advisory committee to pro-
vide appropriate injunctive remedies for plaintiffs in FACA suits. 
II. FACA's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PROVISIONS 
The executive branch's use of advisory committees has grown at an 
unprecedented rate in the twentieth century. As the number and use 
of unregulated advisory committees continued to grow, Congress and 
the President recognized the need for legislation governing advisory 
committee operations. The first attempt at regulating advisory com-
27 See, e.g., Seattle Audubon, 871 F. Supp. at 1309. 
28 The Eleventh Circuit read an injunctive remedy into FACA in Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers 
Coalition v. Department of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103, 1107 (11th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Alabama v. 
DOl]. 
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mittees came in the form of an Executive Order from President 
Kennedy. As the inadequacies of the Executive Order became appar-
ent, Congress moved toward passing FACA. 
A. Historical Background Leading to FACA's Passage 
The use of advisory committees has been long recognized as a 
valuable way to provide the government with "the best technical 
brains and experience of all fields of business, industrial or profes-
sional endeavor, at little or no cost."29 However, as the number of 
advisory committees grew substantially in the first half of the twen-
tieth century, the legislature and executive became increasingly 
aware that under the then unregulated system, most advisory com-
mittees were wholly unaccounted for in number, purpose, and mem-
bership.30 With no regulation, it was likely that some agencies had 
not formed advisory committees for the purpose of giving advice 
at all, but rather to promote the objectives of special interest 
groups-objectives that rarely coincided with the public inter-
est.3! These problems were particularly likely in environmental advi-
sory committees, which historically were dominated by private 
industry.32 
1. The First Attempt at Advisory Committee Regulation: 
Executive Order 11,007 and Its Weaknesses 
Concern over advisory committee abuse led President Kennedy to 
issue Executive Order 11,007 in 1962 to provide standard minimum 
regulation of advisory committees not already specifically regulated 
by statute.33 Although the Executive Order was an encouraging at-
tempt at regulating advisory committees, the Executive Order's am-
biguities and limitations would soon become apparent.34 
The Executive Order mandated that advisory committees be 
formed only to provide advice.35 Under the Executive Order, each 
committee should be reasonably representative of the industrial and 
29 H.R. REP. No. 576, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957) (as cited in Markham, supra note 22, at 
559). 
:10 See Markham, supra note 22, at 558-60. 
31 [d. at 559. 
32 See Gage & Epstein, supra note 17, at 5000l. 
:l:l See Exec. Order No. 11,007, § 1,27 Fed. Reg. 1875 (1962). 
34 See Markham, supra note 22, at 560-64. 
35 See Exec. Order No. 11,007, § 4. 
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geographical segment to which the committee's functions related.36 
Committee meetings were to be held only at the call of, or with 
approval from, a full-time salaried officer or employee of the depart-
ment or agency to which the committee reported.37 This officer was 
to approve the agenda of any committee meeting, was to keep and 
certify minutes and transcripts of the meeting, and was to adjourn 
the meeting whenever the officer considered adjournment to be in the 
public's best interest.38 Any committee whose duration was not fixed 
by law would terminate two years from the date the committee was 
formed.39 Termination could be halted if the head of the department 
or agency utilizing the committee determined, in writing, that con-
tinuation of the committee was in the public's best interest.4o In such 
case, the committee could continue for another two-year periodY To 
help keep a record of the number and function of all advisory commit-
tees, the Executive Order also required that, where practical and not 
overly expensive, each agency or department utilizing advisory com-
mittees record the name and function of its committees, the names 
and affiliations of committee members, and committee meeting 
dates.42 The agency or department was then required to provide this 
information to the Attorney General and to publish it in its annual 
report.43 
Although Executive Order 11,007 was considered a laudable at-
tempt at controlling advisory committees, Congress recognized that 
the Order had numerous limitations. Accordingly, in 1969 the House 
Special Studies Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Op-
erations began an intensive study of advisory committees.44 The study 
and the congressional testimony that accompanied the study, illumi-
nated some of the regulatory problems that had continued under the 
Executive Order. A major weakness of the Executive Order was that 
the Order contained an option to waive all administrative require-
36Id. § 5. 
37Id. § 6(a). 
:lH Id. §§ 6(b)-(c). 
3" Id. § 8. 
40 Exec. Order No. 11,007, § 8. 
41Id. 
42Id. § lO(a). 
43Id. § lOeb). 
44 H.R. REP. No. 1731, 91st Congo 2d Sess., intro., 1 (1970). The objective of the study was to 
review the operations and effectiveness of committees advising the federal government, to 
assess the possibility of abuse and over-use of committees, and where appropriate to make 
findings and recommendations for constructive reform. Id. 
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ments, whenever the head of the agency or department to which a 
committee reported determined that compliance with the Order's 
mandates was impractical or would interfere with the committee's 
functions.45 In addition, there was still no mandatory method of track-
ing the number of advisory committees, their functions, or their mem-
bers.46 At times, advisory committees were even used to delay the 
solution to a problem, rather than to help solve the problem.47 The 
chairman of the advisory committee congressional hearings, Repre-
sentative John S. Monagan, described advisory committees as "sort 
of like satellites, I think of them that way ... they go out into outer 
space but they keep circling around, you know, and no one really 
knows how many there are or what direction they are going in, or 
what duplication there is."48 
The biggest limitation of the Executive Order was that the Order 
did little to prevent industry professionals from dominating advisory 
committees.49 The Executive Order allowed an agency to form advi-
sory committees made up only of industrial representatives.50 These 
committees were often self-serving, did not represent the public in-
terest, and were irresponsible and arbitrary in their use of power.5I 
Congressional testimony indicated that at times the advisors them-
selves, not the government officials utilizing the advisors, were re-
sponsible for final decisionmaking.52 This responsibility gave industry 
professionals power at the electoral, policy-making, and implementa-
tion levels.53 
Testimony throughout the congressional hearings illustrated why 
industry-dominated advisory groups, which remained common de-
spite the Executive Order, were such a substantial problem in the 
environmental context. Senate testimony pointed out that environ-
45Id. at 9; Exec. Order No. 11,007, § 6(D; see also Markham, supra note 22, at 564. 
40 See FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2(a)-(b). 
47 Markham, supra note 22, at 563. 
48 H.R. REP. No. 1731, supra note 44, at 2. 
49 See Exec. Order No. 11,007, § 5. This broad section of the Executive Order only required 
that advisory committees be "reasonably representative of the group of industries, the single 
industry, or the geographical, service, or product segment thereof to which it relates .... " Id. 
The Executive Order still allowed the existence of advisory committees made up only of 
industrial professionals, as long as there was a representative group thereof. Id. The Executive 
Order did not require that advisory committees contain members from outside industry. Id. 
50Id. 
5! Markham, supra note 22, at 563. 
52Id. at 565; see also Steck testimony, supra note 17, at 346-47. 
53 Markham, supra note 22, at 565; see also Steck testimony, supra note 17, at 346-47. 
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mental policymaking had been assumed primarily by the federal gov-
ernment and had shifted from control by Congress, which answers 
directly to its constituency, to control by executive agencies, which 
only answer to the executive branch that creates the agencies.54 The 
establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the Council on Environmental Quality and the enactment of the N a-
tional Environmental Policy Act55 had established an administrative 
base for environmental policy.56 The executive decision-making proc-
ess, which relies heavily on advisory committee findings, can effect 
the outcome of agency decisions and can have a dramatic effect on the 
substance of those decisions.57 "[O]ne very great danger is that indus-
try will gain an inordinate power in the administrative process and 
that the public will no longer be in a position to bring a countervailing 
influence to bear."58 
Senate testimony contained a specific example of the influence in-
dustry had on environmental policy. In 1970, President Nixon estab-
lished the National Industrial Pollution Control Council (Council), an 
advisory committee composed of chief executives of major American 
industries and trade associations.59 Not one member of the Council 
came from an ecological or conservation group, state or local govern-
ment, or consumer interest group.60 Nixon established the Council to 
advise him on federal legislation and regulations relating to pollution 
control and abatement.61 Nixon made it clear that the Council was to 
be the vital link between industry and government in establishing 
environmental policy.62 One critic of the Council stated that "[it] con-
stitut[ed] a prominent device by which industry is institutionally and 
legitimately joined to the structure of government decisionmaking. 
The system ... forms ... a kind of shadow branch of government."63 
The criticism was that Nixon's broad mandate for the Council could 
make its power and influence so great that the Council, an advisory 
committee, could have an environmental impact equal to that of a 
54 Steck testimony, supra note 17, at 346. 
55 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994). 
56 Steck testimony, supra note 17, at 346. 
57 [d. 
513 [d. 
59 [d. at 351. 
60 [d. 
61 Steck testimony, supra note 17, at 347-48. 
62 [d. 
6B [d. 
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regulatory executive agency like the EPA.64 According to one com-
mentator, the President had delegated public policymaking to a pri-
vate group of industrial professionals.65 Such delegation blurs the 
distinction between public and private interests and results in one-
sided public policy.66 Considering the enormous scientific, informa-
tional, financial, and legal resources that industry has under its con-
trol, there is a legitimate danger that public policy will be unduly 
influenced.67 Even the chairman of Nixon's Council recognized the 
power the Council could wield.68 In fact, the chairman had urged the 
industrial Council members to develop environmental policies of their 
own, rather than be forced to tailor their industrial operations to 
policies "legislated upon them" by the federal government.69 
In addition to allowing advisory committees made up of only indus-
trial professionals, the Executive Order also allowed advisory com-
mittees to hold their meetings behind closed doors.7o For example, in 
64 Id. 
The reason for this is obvious. The control of information, advice and support to the 
policy makers is a material form of power for an advisory committee. It is a form of 
power which an agency official can ill afford to ignore and which can determine the real 
as distinct from the apparent public success of the policy itself. 
Id. at 348. 
65 See Steck testimony, supra note 17, at 355. 
66Id. 
67 See id. at 348. 
till Advisory Committees: United States Senate Hearings on S. 1637 and S. 196.1; Before the 
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Operations, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 410-11 (1971) (statement of Bert S. Cross, Chairman, National Industrial 
Pollution Control Council, and Chairman, Finance Committee, Minnesota Mining & Manufac-
turing Co.) [hereinafter Cross testimony]. 
69 Steck testimony, supra note 17, at 348. In the words of a critic of the council: 
pollution control regulations and pollution abatement technology will introduce a host 
of new and very costly factors into the industrial system. The council is in a position 
to help rationalize a new and possibly disruptive force as well as to influence the 
emergence of a new growth industry in pollution control. ... [T]he council might well 
become the focal point for a measure of industrial self-government and so give an 
unfortunate quasi-corporate character to the linkage between the industrial commu-
nity and the environmental bureaucracy. 
Id. 
70 Exec. Order No. 11,007, §§ 6(c)-(d). All that the Executive Order required was that an 
advisory committee keep minutes of each meeting containing a minimum of the persons present, 
a description of matters discussed, and conclusions reached. In addition, advisory committees 
were to include with the minutes copies of all reports received, issued, or approved by the 
committee. Finally, the Executive Order required an advisory committee to keep a verbatim 
transcript of all committee meetings. However, this requirement easily could be waived if the 
head of the department or agency utilizing the committee stated that waiver was in the public 
interest.Id. 
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order to keep track of the Council's activities, representatives of ten 
conservation groups had requested and had been denied access to the 
Council's meetings.71 As one commentator noted, "the power of a 
committee to develop its own environmental policies, rather than to 
'submit' to those policies the government might force upon the com-
mittee, becomes even more threatening when the committee's meet-
ings are closed to the public."72 In a closed meeting, there is no method 
for non-industrial groups to influence the policies the advisory com-
mittee has been given power to implement.73 This barrier to public 
participation eliminates the opportunity to address policy alternatives 
that might have been raised by industry outsiders.74 As Senator Lee 
Metcalf, a sponsor of the Open Advisory Committee Act, a predeces-
sor to FACA stated: 
[b]ecause [the Council] is a closed group, its recommendations are 
bound to be suspect. At the very least, there should be a certain 
percentage of observers there to allay the public's suspicions that 
this closed group is sitting there to assure the continuation of the 
kind of pollution that they have caused for years.75 
To further illustrate his point, Senator Metcalf discussed another 
example of the type of advisory committee abuse that continued to 
occur, despite the Executive Order.76 In the late 1960s, environmen-
talists had been publicizing the dangers of phosphates in laundry 
detergent, and the public was clamoring for a solution.77 The laundry 
71 Steck testimony, supra note 17, at 351. 
72 Id. at 350. 
7:l See id. 
74Id. Senate testimony stated that: "the relative cloak of secrecy surrounding its work would 
not in my judgment exist unless the Council were seeking to enjoy a privileged and closed 
relationship with the highest levels of Government in the area of governmental policy." Id. at 
351. 
75 Cross testimony, supra note 68, at 411. Senator Metcalf went on to say that the President 
had created a closed, special club of the outstanding industrialists throughout the country and 
they are the people who have contributed the most to environmental pollution. "[W]hen [indus-
trial advisory committees] meet with sanitized minutes, how will we ever know what the 
conclusions and what the discussions are?" Id. Professor Steck continued his testimony by 
stating that: 
as long as peak bodies like the industrial council are in a position to control the flow 
of advice and knowledge and as long as that position is closed, the system cannot be 
regarded as neutral and therefore impersonally open and responsive to the general 
public, to public interest groups, or to non-industrial groups. By its very structure, the 
process is biased in favor of some things and against others. 
Steck testimony, supra note 17, at 356. 
76 See Cross testimony, supra note 68, at 415. 
77 See id. n.2. 
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detergent industry faced a public relations nightmare that could sig-
nificantly affect its sales.78 In 1970, the Detergent Subcouncil, an 
advisory committee consisting solely of representatives from the 
laundry detergent industry, issued a report for the Secretary of Com-
merce containing a possible solution to the phosphate scare.79 The 
Detergent Sub council's report recommended the use of a new mate-
rial called nitrilotriacetic acid (NTA) as a safe replacement for phos-
phates in laundry detergent.so The Detergent Subcouncil indicated 
that after extensive human and environmental safety tests, levels of 
NTA which would be used in the detergent were safe for people and 
for the environment.81 Yet, earlier that same year, Dr. Samuel Epstein, 
Chief of the Environmental Toxicology Carcinogenic Children's Can-
cer Research Center, told a Senate subcommittee that the proposed 
use of NTA should be disallowed because studies had shown NTA 
to be related to cancer and audiogenic defects.82 One year after issu-
ing its report, the Detergent Subcouncil advisory committee admit-
ted that, based on information from outside experiments conducted 
subsequent to its report, significant portions of the report were ren-
dered obsolete and misleading.83 The Surgeon General and the Admin-
istrator of the EPA were then forced to halt the implementation of 
NTA.84 Senator Metcalf suggested that if the public had been apprised 
of the Detergent Subcouncil's activities and allowed to participate in 
its meetings, the dangers of NTA might have come to light much 
earlier.85 
It is clear from these examples of congressional testimony that, 
although Executive Order 11,007 was a promising beginning to advi-
sory committee regulation, the Order had its problems. Many of these 
problems were subsequently addressed by FACA. 
2. The Next Attempt at Regulating Advisory Committees: 
Congress Moves Toward Passing FACA 
Advisory committee abuses such as those described above, led the 
House of Representatives to introduce Bill 4383 on February 17, 
78 See id. 
79Id. 
f'I) Id. 
8! Cross testimony, supra note 68, at 415. 
W1.Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 415-16. 
85 See id. at 415-17. 
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1971.86 Bill 4383 had two primary purposes. Bill 4383's first purpose 
was to correct the inadequacies existing under Executive Order 
11,007.87 Bill 4383's second purpose was to address the fear that many 
advisory committees were nothing more than governmentally funded, 
privately conducted, industry trade associations.88 Bill 4383 had no 
option for an agency to waive its requirements, a weakness that 
existed under the Executive Order.89 
The House of Representatives concern that advisory committees 
be well-balanced was accompanied by the Senate's concern that advi-
sory committee meetings were not open to the public.90 These "secret" 
committees were advising elected and appointed government officials 
and creating a government not accountable to the public.91 The House 
and Senate subsequently introduced numerous additional bills. One 
was Senate Bill 1637, the Open Advisory Committee Act, introduced 
by Senator Metcalf, which proposed drastic changes in the advisory 
committee system.92 Bill 1637 required, among other things, that ad-
visory committee meetings be open to the public, that membership on 
advisory committees be fairly balanced, and that noncompliance with 
the Act could be challenged in court.93 Bill 1637 required that one-
third of the membership of any advisory committee must come from 
the public sector, unrelated to either industry or government.94 The 
less restrictive House Bill 4383 was similar in intent, though not as 
strong in its mandates as Bill 1637. Bill 4383 eventually became the 
basis for FACA.95 
B. FACA's Provisions and How They Were Expected to Cure 
Advisory Committee Abuses Which Continued Under Executive 
Order 11,007 
Congress enacted FACA on October 6, 1972, in recognition that 
stringent regulation of executive branch advisory committees was 
both necessary and overdue.96 FACA illustrates Congress's determi-
86 H.R. 4383, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971). 
87 See generally Steck testimony, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
88 [d.; see also Markham, supra note 22, at 565. 
89 Exec. Order No. 11,007 § 6(0. 
90 See H.R. REP. No. 1731, supra note 44, at 7; Cross testimony, supra note 68, at 411-12. 
91 Cross testimony, supra note 68, at 411. 
92 See Gage & Epstein, supra note 17, at 50001. 
93 [d. 
94 [d. 
95 [d. 
96 FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-2; see also H.R. REP. No. 1731, supra note 44, at 6-7. 
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nation to control this powerful "fifth arm of government," which had 
become nearly as powerful as the administrative agencies-often la-
beled the fourth arm of government-that created the advisory com-
mittees.97 
FACA was enacted to cut down on waste created by unnecessary 
and duplicative advisory committees, to open committee meetings to 
public scrutiny and participation, and to ensure that the committees 
be made up of a well-balanced membership and not dominated by 
private special interest groupS.98 To promote these goals, FACA is 
both administrative-in that it places specific requirements on the 
establishment and operation of advisory committees-and remedial-
in that it seeks to correct abuses in the advisory committee system.99 
One aim of FACA was to cut governmental spending by limiting 
the number of advisory committees'!<)() To achieve this goal, FACA 
requires that the President or an executive agency may only establish 
essential new advisory committees.lOl An advisory committee is es-
sential under FACA when the work the committee will do is not and 
cannot be done by an existing committee.102 FACA also requires auto-
matic termination of an advisory committee after two years or when 
the committee is no longer carrying out its purpose.103 
Another aim of FACA was to eliminate industry domination of 
advisory committees.104 To encourage public participation in the advi-
sory committee process, FACA requires that all advisory committees 
publish in the Federal Register the date and location of meetings, 
open meetings to public scrutiny and participation, and make detailed 
minutes, transcripts, and other documents from these meetings avail-
able for public inspection.lo5 In addition, to prevent private industry 
97 Markham, supra note 22, at 557. The first four arms of the government included the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, as well as administrative agencies, which had been 
characterized as the fourth arm of the government. 118 CONGo REC. H. 4275 (daily ed. May 9, 
1972) (remarks of Rep. Monagan) (as cited in Markham, supra note 22, at 557). 
98 FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2,5. 
99 Markham, supra note 22, at 570-71. 
100 See H.R. REP. No. 1731, supra note 44, at 5-7. 
101 FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b)(2). 
102 [d. § 5(a); see also Markham, supra note 22, at 579. 
103 FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 14. 
104 See H.R. REP. No. 1731, supra note 44, at 7. 
105 FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2,5. See also Food Chem. News V. Department of Health and 
Human Servs., 980 F.2d 1468, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1992), which states that such requirements shall 
not apply to any portion of an advisory committee meeting where the President or the head of 
the agency to which the committee reports determines that such portion of the meeting may 
be closed to the public in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c), the Freedom of Information Act. 
Under § 10(b) of FACA, unless the information is exempt from FACA under the Freedom of 
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from dominating advisory committees, FACA requires that each ad-
visory committee consist of a balanced membership.lo6 Although "bal-
anced membership" was not specifically defined in FACA, commenta-
tors have agreed that it means an advisory committee which is 
broadly representative of all sectors of the public with an interest in 
the subject matter of the committee.lo7 For example, an advisory 
committee with a balanced membership might consist of industry 
and local government representatives, an environmental group rep-
resentative, a university professor, a labor union member, and a pri-
vate citizens group member. 
FACA vests advisory committee oversight in the General Serv-
ices Administration (GSA) of the Office of Management and Budget, 
and the standing committees of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives that have jurisdiction over the advisory committee.108 
These groups are responsible for overseeing the creation and termi-
nation of advisory committees and for ensuring that the committees 
comply with FACA's procedural requirements.109 
III. THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF FACA 
At present, FACA is used by both environmental and industrial 
plaintiffs to halt the implementation of regulations based on advice 
from advisory committees operating in violation of FACA. Courts, in 
deciding FACA cases, have first had to address the definition of an 
advisory committee subject to FACA's mandates. Courts also have 
had to address the question of who has standing to sue for FACA 
violations. Even when courts have decided the standing question 
Information Act, an agency is generally obligated to make all documents available for public 
inspection and copying. It is not necessary that a member of the public request disclosure in 
order for the materials to be made available. Food Chem. News, 980 F.2d at 1469. 
106 FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(2). See also Public Citizen v. National Advisory Comm. on 
Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 708 F. Supp. 359, 364 (D.D.C. 1988) [hereinafter National 
Advisory Comm.J in which the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held 
a committee to be fairly balanced. The committee was formed to provide advice and recommen-
dations to the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services on the development 
of microbiological criteria by which the safety and wholesomeness of food could be assessed. 
National Advisory Comm., 708 F. Supp. at 360. The committee was made up of two university 
professors, one state agriculture department official, one state department of agriculture and 
consumer services official, two people employed by food research firms, six people employed by 
federal agencies, and six people employed by private food companies. [d. 
107 Gage & Epstein, supra note 17, at 50001. 
108 FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 5,7. 
109 [d. 
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favorably and when a committee is found to be an advisory committee 
subject to FACA, plaintiffs in FACA suits have been relatively un-
successful. 
A. To Whom Does FACA Apply?-The Statutory and Judicial 
Definitions of an Advisory Committee 
The statutory definition of an advisory committee subject to FACA 
is quite broad, indicating that Congress expected FACA's application 
to be broad as,wellYO Yet, as with most statutory construction, courts 
realized that for practical purposes, they had to put some parameters 
on FACA's application.111 In an attempt to limit and clarify the defini-
tion of an advisory committee subject to FACA, courts have turned 
a comprehensive and objective statutory definition into one that is 
limited, subjective, and ambiguous, and have subsequently excluded 
numerous groups from the definition of an advisory committee.112 
FACA defines an advisory committee as the following: 
any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, 
task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other 
subgroup thereof which is (A) established by statute or reorgani-
zation plan, or (B) established or utilized by the President, or (C) 
established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of 
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or 
more agencies or officers of the Federal Government.ll3 
FACA's definition includes as an advisory committee any advisory 
group established by the executive branch, as well as any group 
established outside the executive branch but utilized by either an 
executive agency or the President.114 Although the definition appears 
to be quite broad, courts have attempted to limit its scope, making 
FACA's application less comprehensive than a literal reading of 
FACA's language would indicateY5 As one court stated, if read liter-
I1°Id. § 3(2). See also Markham, supra note 22, at 571 stating that FACA's purposes will be 
accomplished only if FACA is interpreted broadly. 
111 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 441 (1989); Food 
Chern. News v. Young, 900 F.2d 328, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
112 See, e.g., Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 441; Food Chem. News, 900 F.2d at 331. 
113 FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 3 specifically excludes the Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, the Commission on Government Procurement, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and the Federal Reserve System. FACA also specifically excludes any committee which 
is wholly made up of full-time officers or employees of the Federal government. Id. 
114 See id. 
115 See, e.g., Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 454. 
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ally, FACA would apply to any conversation between two or more 
people supplying information to any government official.116 According 
to courts, applying FACA to all such situations would effectively stifle 
much of the daily intercourse between government and the rest of the 
nation.H7 Yet, in courts' attempts to restrict the definition of an advi-
sory committee, the definition has become rather muddied. As a re-
sult, there is no clear test to determine whether a committee is an 
advisory committee within the meaning of FACA or simply a group 
rendering advice but not subject to FACA's terms.HS 
In the Supreme Court's most recent attempt at defining an advisory 
committee, the Court changed the definition from an objective one, as 
stated in FACA, to a subjective one. In Public Citizen v. United 
States Department of Justice, 119 the plaintiff argued that the Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association 
(ABA Committee) was an advisory committee within the meaning of 
FACA and should therefore operate in compliance with FACA. How-
ever, for years the ABA Committee had advised the President on 
potential judicial nominees without complying with FACA.120 
In deciding whether the ABA Committee was an advisory commit-
tee subject to FACA, the Court examined the legislative history of 
FACA and determined that FACA was enacted to cure specific abuses 
Congress had found to pervade the advisory committee system-in 
particular, wasted funds for worthless committees, closed meetings, 
and biased proposals by special interest groupS.121 The Court stated 
that, based on FACA's purpose, it was unlikely that Congress ex-
pected FACA to apply to every formal and informal consultation 
between the President or an executive agency and a group rendering 
advice.122 Based on this reading, the Court held that FACA should 
apply to an advisory committee only when the advisory committee 
system is in danger of being abused, as contemplated by Congress.123 
Applying this reasoning, the Court held that the ABA Committee was 
116 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Herrington, 637 F. Supp. 116, 117-18 (D.D.C. 1986). 
117Id. 
11H See, e.g., id. 
119 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 440. 
120Id. 
121Id. 
122Id. 
12.1Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Food 
Chemical News v. Young, interpreted the Supreme Court's reading in Public Citizen as limiting 
FACA to "groups organized by or closely tied to the Federal government and thus enjoying 
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not an advisory committee subject to FACA because there was little 
danger that the ABA Committee procedures would be abused.124 The 
Court's subjective definition of an advisory committee conflicts with 
the objective definition of an advisory committee under FACNs lan-
guage. FACNs language would include any group either formed or 
utilized by an executive agency for the purpose of rendering advice.125 
The Court's definition, however, only requires that a committee com-
ply with FACA where a court decides that the committee is in danger 
of abusing the advisory committee system. 
This subjective interpretation of what constitutes an advisory com-
mittee subject to FACA has resulted in numerous groups being ex-
empt from FACNs requirements. For example, as discussed, the 
Court excluded the ABA Committee from the definition of an advi-
sory committee despite the fact that the ABA Committee is "utilized" 
by the President, as defined in FACA.126 The United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia excluded from the definition of an 
advisory committee, a group of six scientists organized by the Secre-
tary of Energy to study the safety of a government-owned nuclear 
reactor in Washington.127 This group was established by an executive 
agency for the purpose of rendering advice. However, applying the 
subjective definition of an advisory committee, the court excluded the 
scientific committee because it found no danger that the committee 
would abuse the advisory committee process.l28 The United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia also excluded a group of 
nine governors convened to provide advice to the EPA regarding the 
problem of states' abilities to carry out federally delegated programs 
to ensure safe drinking water.l29 In each of these cases, a court used 
the subjective definition of an advisory committee to find that FACA 
did not apply because there was no danger of promoting the evils 
quasi-public status." Food Chemical News v. Young, 900 F.2d 328, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also 
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 440. The court in Food Chemical News held that this definition of 
an advisory committee did not apply to a panel of experts established and utilized by a private 
organization and government contractor. 900 F.2d at 331. The court held that the committee did 
not have a quasi-public status and was therefore different from an advisory committee estab-
lished by a public executive agency. [d. 
124 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 440. 
125 [d. 
126 See generally, id. 
127 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Herrington, 637 F. SUpp. 116, 117 (D.D.C 1986). 
128 [d. at 120. 
129 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 806 F. Supp. 275, 
276--78 (D.D.C. 1992). 
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Congress was trying to cure in passing FACA. Because courts found 
none of these groups to be an advisory committee, none were subject 
to FACA's requirements. 
B. How FACA Has Been Used as an Environmental Cause of 
Action 
1. Standing to Sue for FACA Violations 
FACA is one way for environmental plaintiffs to attempt to halt the 
implementation of legislation or regulations passed on advice from an 
advisory committee. FACA does not expressly provide for judicial 
process by which a member of the public may seek to enforce its 
requirements. Yet, violations of agency regulations in general have 
been recognized as a legitimate cause of action since Sierra Club v. 
Morton.13o In Sierra Club, the Supreme Court applied the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA)13I to the standing question. The APA 
states, in relevant part, that "a person suffering legal wrong because 
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action 
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review 
thereof."132 The Court interpreted this language to mean that under 
the APA, persons had standing to obtain judicial review where the 
persons alleged that (1) an agency's violation of a statute had caused 
them "injury in fact," and (2) the alleged injury was to an interest 
"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by 
the statute the agency was alleged to have violated."133 The Court in 
Sierra Club held that as long as the plaintiff was among those injured, 
the alleged injury-threat to aesthetic and environmental well-be-
ing-was a legitimate injury.l34 The fact that such an environmental 
interest may be shared by many rather than by just a few would not 
make a plaintiff less deserving of legal protection through the judicial 
process.l35 
130 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732--34 (1971). 
131 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). 
132 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 73~3. 
133 [d. 
134 [d. at 734. 
135 See id. 
1995] FACNS ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURE 105 
In Sierra Club the Court provided standing to sue for harm caused 
when an administrative agency violates a statute or regulation.136 The 
Court affirmed standing to sue specifically under FACA in Public 
Citizen v. United States Department of Justice. 137 In Public Citizen, 
the Court held that a committee's refusal to allow the plaintiff to 
scrutinize its activities as required by FACA constituted a sufficiently 
distinct injury to provide standing.138 Under such circumstances, the 
administrative agency which established the advisory committee is 
the object of the suit, as the agency is responsible for ensuring that 
its advisory committees comply with FACA.139 
Once a plaintiff claims it has been sufficiently injured by a FACA 
violation to meet the standing requirement, FACA enables special 
interest groups, private citizens, and industry professionals to ensure 
open access to advisory committee meetings and to argue against the 
implementation of rules and regulations promulgated by an executive 
agency on advice from a committee acting in violation of FACA. In 
most of these cases, however, and particularly in the environmental 
context, plaintiffs suing for FACA violations have met with relatively 
little success. 
2. Examples of Unsuccessful Attempts to Bring Actions in 
Environmental Cases for FACA Violations 
Both environmental and industrial groups have used FACA to at-
tempt-usually unsuccessfully-to block the implementation of regu-
lations promulgated on advice from an advisory committee alledgedly 
in violation ofFACA. In one such case, American Petroleum Institute 
v. Costle, the plaintiffs were an environmental conservation group and 
an industrial group that would be affected by newly promulgated 
regulations.14o 
In 1980, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) argued 
that the EPA, under the Clean Air Act,141 had established primary 
and secondary national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for 
136Id. 
137 Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 451 (1989). 
138 Id. at 440. 
139 See generally, id. 
140 American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinafter API 
v. Costlel. 
141 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994). 
106 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:87 
ozone that were too lenient.142 In the same action, the American Pe-
troleum Institute (API) and the City of Houston argued that the 
standards were too stringent.l43 The plaintiffs sued the EPA and 
requested injunctive relief for FACA violations.l44 
The EPA had retained a panel of paid expert environmental con-
sultants (the Shy Panel) to assist it in establishing the NAAQS.145 The 
Shy Panel was responsible for determining the level of ozone concen-
tration that might cause adverse health effects and for reporting 
those findings to the EPA.146 The plaintiffs argued that the Shy Panel 
was an advisory committee within the meaning of FACA and that, 
because the EPA failed to follow FACA's requirements in establishing 
and controlling the panel, the EPA's subsequent reliance on the 
panel's study and advice required invalidation of the resulting air 
quality standard.147 
The Shy Panel held private meetings and drafted a report which 
the panel submitted to the EPA.I48 The plaintiffs complained that the 
Shy Panel violated FACA by failing to provide public notice of panel 
meetings and by prohibiting the public from participating in the meet-
ings.149 The plaintiffs also argued that the choice of a known partisan 
to head the committee violated FACA's requirement that an advisory 
committee be fairly balanced and not inappropriately influenced by a 
special interest.15o 
The Shy Panel appears to fit FACA's definition of an advisory 
committee, which applies to "any panel ... established or utilized by 
one or more agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or recom-
mendations."151 Yet, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit declined to reach the issue of whether the 
Shy Panel was an advisory committee under FACA.152 The court held 
that even if the Shy Panel was an advisory committee subject to 
FACA, and even if FACA violations had occurred, there was no 
evidence that had the committee complied with all ofFACA's require-
142 API VO Costle, 665 F02d at 1181. 
143 Ido 
144 Ido 
145Ido 
146Ido 
147 API VO Costle, 665 F02d at 11890 
148 Ido 
149Ido 
150 Ido 
151 FACA, 5 UoS.C. appo § 30 
152 API VO Costle, 665 F02d at 11900 
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ments, the EPA's resulting NAAQS would have been any different.153 
Even if EPA reliance on the panel's study was illegal, the court chose 
not to invalidate the subsequent air quality standards based solely on 
the procedural violations.l54 
Equally unsuccessful in a FACA suit were several non-profit plain-
tiffs in Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons.155 Seattle Audubon was the 
culmination of a series of lawsuits fighting the implementation of the 
Clinton Administration's "Forest Plan for a Sustainable Economy and 
a Sustainable Environment" (Forest Plan) for over twenty-four mil-
lion acres of federally owned forest lands in the Pacific N orthwest.156 
The plaintiffs were a not-for-profit association called the Northwest 
Forest Resource Council (NFRC), which represented the interests of 
the timber and other forest-products industries in Oregon and Wash-
ington, and the Native Forest Council, a public interest group whose 
purpose was to protect forest lands.157 The defendants were the 
United States Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior, the Forest 
Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FE MAT), and FEMAT's 
chairman.15s President Clinton had established FEMAT to employ an 
"ecosystem" approach to achieve the greatest possible economic and 
social contribution from the forests. 159 FEMAT was made up of six 
sub-teams and fourteen advisory groups.160 Altogether, between six 
and seven hundred people contributed to FEMAT's final report, at a 
total cost to the government of $3.1 million.16l 
FEMAT compiled a report of ten forest management options.162 
Option nine became the basis for President Clinton's Forest Plan 
released on July 1, 1993.163 The plaintiffs in Seattle Audubon argued 
that FEMAT was an advisory committee within the meaning of 
FACA and that the committee's refusal to allow the plaintiffs and the 
public to attend its meetings rendered the meetings and their results 
158 [d. This holding seems to be akin to a harmless error standard, although the court did not 
expressly state it as such. See id. 
154 [d. 
155 Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1299-1301 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
156 [d. at 1299-1300. 
157 [d. 
158 [d. at 1309. 
159 Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.D.C. 1994) (one of 
several lower court opinions which culminated in Seattle Audubon). 
160 [d. 
161 [d. 
162 Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1303 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
163 [d. at 1304. 
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invalid.164 The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief stating that FEMAT 
was indeed an advisory committee-and injunctive relief barring the 
defendants from relying on FEMAT's report, compiled in violation of 
FACA.165 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington found that FEMAT was an advisory committee and that the 
committee had violated FACA.166 Specifically, FEMAT had not been 
established under a charter, as FACA required.167 FEMAT failed to 
publish notice of its meetings in the Federal Register and refused to 
open its meetings to the public.168 In addition, FEMAT neglected to 
make records and other documents available for public view and 
neglected to keep detailed minutes of meetings.169 Finally, FEMAT 
made no attempt to ensure that its membership was fairly balanced 
and that the advice and recommendations FEMAT rendered were not 
inappropriately influenced by any special interests.17o 
Turning to the plaintiffs' remedial requests, the court acknow-
ledged that FACA does not specifically prescribe remedies for viola-
tions of its mandates. l7l Therefore, the court concluded it must "exer-
cise its general equitable powers to fashion relief that would 
represent the appropriate remedy for plaintiff's injuries caused by the 
violation[s] of FACA."172 The court issued declaratory relief stating 
that FEMAT was an advisory committee and had violated FACA.173 
The court, however, refused injunctive relief, stating that an injunc-
tion enjoining utilization of FEMAT's report would exceed the plain-
tiffs' injuries.174 The court found nothing in the evidence to indicate 
that even if FEMAT had scrupulously complied with FACA, FE-
MAT's report, advice, or recommendations would have been any dif-
ferent. 175 The court stated that an injunction would be premature, as 
at the time of the suit, the Forest Plan, based on FEMAT's report, 
164 [d. at 1309. 
165 [d. 
166 [d. 
167 Seattle Audubon, 871 F. Supp. at 1309; Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Espy, 846 
F. Supp. 1009, 1013-14 CD.D.C 1994). 
16R Espy, 846 F. Supp. at 1013-14. 
loB [d. 
170 [d. 
171 [d. at 1014. 
172 [d. 
17:l Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1309 (W.D. Wash 1994). 
174 [d. at 1309-10. 
175 [d. at 1310. 
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was simply a plan.176 "[The Forest Plan] had yet to be translated into 
action. There will be time enough when the Forest Plan is imple-
mented to determine if any harm it does to NFRC and its constituents 
can be traced to FEMAT."177 According to critics of the opinion, how-
ever, by the time the Forest Plan was implemented, it would be too 
late to remedy any damage which the Forest Plan might have 
causedPs 
These cases are illustrative of the difficulty plaintiffs have had 
obtaining injunctive relief in environmental suits brought for FACA 
violations despite the clear FACA violations. However, a case from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is an 
encouraging exception. 
3. A Plaintiff Succeeds in an Environmental Suit Based on FACA 
Violations 
It was not until Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Fish & 
Wildlife Service of the United States Department of the Interior that 
a plaintiff prevailed in an environmental action brought under FACA 
and received injunctive relief.179 The relevant events leading up to the 
suit began in June, 1993, when the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
published a proposed rule to list the Alabama Sturgeon as an endan-
gered species and to designate the fish's habitat as critical. lso Under 
the Endangered Species Act, once a rule is proposed, the Secretary 
of the Interior has one year either to promulgate a final rule listing 
the species as endangered or to withdraw the FWS's proposed rule. lSI 
To assist in the decision whether or not to list the Alabama Stur-
geon as endangered, the Secretary of the Interior ordered the FWS 
to organize a scientific advisory panel to "consider the best available 
scientific information and assess the current status of the species."IS2 
The FWS organized a panel of four scientists to provide advice to both 
the FWS and the Secretary of the Interior.lS3 The Alabama congres-
176Id. 
177Id. 
m California Forestry Association Vice President Issues Statement, PR Newswire, Dec. 21, 
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. 
m Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Department of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103, 1103 (11th 
Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Alabama v. DOn. 
180Id. at 1104. 
IRlId. 
182Id. at 1104-05. 
183Id. 
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sional delegation immediately raised concerns regarding the panel's 
size and composition.184 The congressional delegation recommended 
increasing the panel's size to improve its objectivity, and proposed six 
scientists as possible candidates.185 The FWS did increase the mem-
bership of the panel from four to nine. However, of those nine mem-
bers, none were drawn from the six scientists the congressional dele-
gation had proposed.186 Three of the nine members came from the 
original four-member panel which had initially caused the congres-
sional delegation to be concerned about the panel's objectivity.187 
At this point, the plaintiff, Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition 
(Coalition), became involved.188 The Coalition was comprised of thirty-
four public organizations and businesses that operated in Alabama 
and Mississippi.189 The Coalition was concerned that listing the Ala-
bama Sturgeon as endangered, and its habitat as critical, would have 
an adverse impact on thousands of jobs.190 In order to ensure an open 
discussion of the issues, the Coalition wrote to the Solicitor for the 
Department of the Interior to request his assurance that the panel 
would comply with FACA.191 Although the Solicitor assured the Coa-
lition that the scientific advisory committee would comply with 
FACA, the committee subsequently violated most of FACA:s pro vi-
sions.192 
The Coalition filed a complaint seeking a temporary restraining 
order and preliminary and permanent injunctions against the release 
of, use of, and reliance on the scientific advisory committee's report. 193 
In response, before the preliminary injunction could be issued, the 
1S4 Alabama v. DOl, 26 F.3d at 1103. 
1"5Id. 
IHG ld. 
1871d. One commentator stated that the FWS had "stacked a supposedly independent scien-
tific review with advocates of listing." Fish & Wildlife Killers, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, June 
18, 1995 at B2. 
I,," ld. 
IH~ Alabama v. DOl, 26 F.3d at 1103. 
I!lO See id. One estimate held the loss at eleven billion dollars and 20,000 jobs over ten years. 
Fish & Wildlife Killers, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, June 18, 1995 at B2. 
m Alabama v. DOl, 26 F.3d at 1105. 
1921d. Specifically, defendant conceded that the panel was not formed under a charter as 
required by FACA, that it did not provide fair notice of its meetings nor did it open those 
meetings to the public, it kept no minutes of meetings, no federal officers or agents were present, 
and there was no attempt to insure that membership of the panel was fairly balanced. Alabama-
Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Fish & Wildlife Servo of the United States Dep't of Interior, 1993 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20322, *3 (N.D. Ala. 1993) [hereinafter Alabama v. FWSj. 
19'1ld. at *4. 
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FWS immediately issued a press release stating that the scientists' 
findings supported listing the Alabama Sturgeon as an endangered 
species.194 The United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Alabama held for the plaintiff Coalition. The court rejected the 
FWS argument that the plaintiff had no remedy for the admitted 
FACA violations and that FACA's procedural requirements are unen-
forceable. 195 The court reasoned that the defendant's restrictive read-
ing of FACA would render the statute a "toothless tiger when used 
in developing a record under the Endangered Species Act."196 The 
court also stated that: 
[the] effect this injunction [would] have on the [endangered spe-
cies] listing process cannot stand in the way of granting the only 
relief this court can conceive of for admitted FACA violations. A 
simple 'excuse us' cannot be sufficient. It would make FACA 
meaningless, something Congress certainly did not intend. FACA 
was designed by Congress to prevent the use of any advisory 
committee as part of the process of making important federal 
agency decisions unless that committee is properly constituted 
and produces its report in compliance with the procedural require-
ments of FACA, particularly where, as in this case, the procedural 
shortcomings are significant and the report potentially influential 
on the outcome.197 
Accordingly, the court granted the Coalition an injunction. The FWS 
was permanently enjoined from publishing, employing, or relying 
either directly or indirectly on the advisory panel's report for any 
purpose in deciding whether or not to list the Alabama Sturgeon as 
an endangered species.19s 
The District Court's interpretation ofFACA and its grant ofinjunc-
tive relief were subsequently upheld on appeal by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.199 The Eleventh Circuit 
explained that there is no authority prohibiting injunctive relief for a 
FACA violation.2°O After reviewing FACA, the court concluded that 
194 ld. 
1951d. 
1961d. 
197 Alabama v. FWS, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20322 at *4-5. 
198 ld. at *6. The final outcome of the listing process was that the DOl's own scientists decided 
that the Alabama Sturgeon is identical to the Mississippi Sturgeon. Consequently, the Secretary 
of the Interior declined to list the fish as endangered or its habitat as critical. Fish & Wildlife 
Killers, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, June 18, 1995 at B2. 
199 Alabama v. DOl, 26 F.3d at 1106-07. 
200 ld. at 1106. 
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such a remedy was indeed available and was a legitimate way to 
ensure compliance with FACA.201 
The Eleventh Circuit also addressed opinions from several other 
jurisdictions that had denied injunctive relief for FACA violations.202 
The court maintained that none of those jurisdictions had held that 
injunctive relief was a categorically unavailable remedy for a FACA 
violation.203 Rather, in those cases, the court concluded injunctive 
relief had simply been an inappropriate remedy based on the facts. 204 
The court distinguished the facts of Alabama-Tombigbee from cases 
where injunctive relief had been denied. For example, the injunctive 
remedy in Alabama-Tombigbee was prospective rather than retroac-
tive, as it would have been in Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons and 
American Petroleum Institute v. Costle. The plaintiffs in those cases 
had sought an injunction before the regulations, based on faulty ad-
visory committee procedure, could be enacted.205 In addition, the court 
stated that the fact that other courts had considered granting injunc-
tive relief reinforced the view that, under proper circumstances, an 
injunction was indeed an appropriate remedy for FACA violations.206 
The court found that the facts of Alabama-Tombigbee were appropri-
ate for injunctive relief.207 The court stated that within FACA, Con-
gress had clearly outlined the procedures required of an advisory 
committee, and that allowing the government to use the product of a 
"tainted procedure" would circumvent the policy behind FACA.208 
According to the court, Congress had legislated advisory committee 
mandates and it was a judicial responsibility to see that those man-
dates were carried out.209 The court reasoned that issuing injunctive 
relief was the only way to insure future compliance with the law.210 
2011d. at 1106-07. 
202 ld. at 1106. 
2031d. 
204 Alabama v. DOl, 26 F.3d at 1106. 
2051d. 
206 ld. at 1106-07. 
2071d. 
2081d. at 1107. 
209 Alabama v. DOl, 26 F.3d at 1107. 
210 ld. 
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IV. THE MAJORITY INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF FACA 
PREVENT FACA FROM FULFILLING ITS LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
When Congress passed FACA in 1972, Congress did so with the 
intention and with the assumption that FACA would put an end to 
duplicative and wasteful executive advisory committees and open 
committee procedures to public scrutiny.211 Congress's purpose was 
two-fold-to save revenue by cutting down on the number of commit-
tees-and to counteract industrial domination of advisory committees 
by insuring that the public would be apprised of committee activities 
and have a chance to voice concerns by participating in committee 
meetings.212 Open-door advisory committee meetings were to become 
the norm rather than the exception.213 Unfortunately, due to both 
unclear statutory language and a flawed judicial interpretation of 
FACA, neither of the goals Congress expected to achieve in passing 
FACA have been met. 
At a cost of almost $144 million a year, funds for advisory commit-
tees still make up a substantial part of the federal budget.214 This 
staggering cost occasionally encourages presidential or congressional 
attempts at piecemeal elimination of useless advisory committees.215 
Yet, ifFACA operated as Congress had originally anticipated, instead 
of the President or Congress eliminating advisory committees one at 
a time through individual legislation, unnecessary committees would 
not be formed in the first place.216 Likewise, in the event that a 
committee had outlived its usefulness, under FACA the committee 
would automatically terminate after two years.217 
211 See Markham, supra note 22, at 557. 
212Id. 
213Id; see also FACA 5 U.S.C. app. § 10. 
214 Brown, supra note 10, at A23. The Department of Health and Human Services itself had 
315 advisory committees in 1993 at a cost to the government of $59 million. Id. 
215Id. President Clinton has eliminated several committees by Executive Order. In addition, 
another thirty-one committees are currently marked for elimination by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. Id. 
216 See FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b)(2) which states that "new advisory committees should be 
established only when they are determined to be essential and their number should be kept to 
the minimum necessary." 
217 See id. § 14(a)(1) which states that "[elach advisory committee ... shall terminate not later 
than the expiration of the two year period following [its establishmentl unless" it fits one of the 
exceptions which follow. 
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In addition to FACA's failure to save federal revenue, FACA has 
also failed to fulfill Congress's goal of opening all advisory committee 
meetings to the public. Closed-door advisory committee meetings still 
prevail, despite FACA's mandates that meetings be open to public 
participation.218 The GSA, which monitors advisory committee activity 
throughout the government, reported that, in fiscal year 1993, there 
were more closed and partially closed advisory committee meetings 
(2,225) than open meetings (2,162).219 It is clear from these statistics 
that a substantial amount of advisory committee work is still done in 
private, away from the public scrutiny and participation that would 
help limit the influence private interest groups have on the agencies 
they are advising. 
A. Problems With FACA'sLanguage and Recommended Solutions 
The reasons for FACA's ineffectiveness are based in part on the 
statute itself, in part on courts' flawed definition of an advisory com-
mittee, and in part on courts' failure to award plaintiffs injunctive 
relief in suits based on FACA violations. The biggest deficiency of 
FACA is that it provides no guidance to either courts or the GSA for 
enforcing FACA's mandates. Although FACA requires agency com-
pliance, there is no directive for punitive action following a FACA 
violation and no explicit provision for judicial enforcement. Nor does 
FACA provide any guidance regarding remedies courts should award 
in suits for FACA violations. 
FACA's lack of a clear enforcement mechanism has resulted in many 
agencies, in turn, not requiring their advisory committees to comply 
with FACA. Under the current statutory scheme, there is no incen-
tive for agencies to comply with FACA and no deterrence to noncom-
pliance. FACA should be amended to provide for the imposition of 
fines against agencies which do not require their advisory committees 
to comply with FACA. In addition to fines, FACA should be amended 
such that in the case of repeated FACA violations, a delinquent 
agency would be denied the privilege of utilizing advisory committees 
for a specific period of time following the violations. 
In addition, FACA's language should require courts to enjoin ex-
ecutive agencies and the President from promulgating legislation or 
regulations based on advisory committee advice rendered by a com-
218 See Brown, supra note 10, at A23. 
219 [d. 
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mittee in violation of FA CA. This combination of fines and retroactive 
injunctions would warn executive agencies that FACA compliance is 
not an option they can choose to ignore with little or no recourse. 
Rather, it is a requirement that is in the agencies' best interest with 
which to comply. 
Commentators have also suggested that FACA's definition of an 
advisory committee subject to its mandates should be clarified.220 A 
literal reading of FACA's definition of an advisory committee leads to 
the conclusion that any group of two or more people, either estab-
lished or utilized by an executive agency or the President for the 
purpose of providing advice, must be in compliance with FACA.221 
Critics ofFACA and courts interpreting FACA have found this defini-
tion troubling out of fear that applying FACA to all such groups will 
stifle every-day conversation that normally occurs throughout the 
government.222 This fear has led courts to overcompensate for what 
they see as an overreaching, overinclusive statute.223 In an attempt to 
restrict FACA's overinclusive language, courts have limited the judi-
cial definition of an advisory committee far beyond what Congress 
ever intended.224 Courts' fear that a literal interpretation of FACA's 
definition of an advisory committee would stifle communication and 
impede governmental decisionmaking is not wholly unfounded. Yet, it 
was not such informal conversations that Congress was seeking to 
prevent.225 Rather, Congress passed FACA to insure that, when a 
group of expert professionals meet to provide advice on governmental 
policy, they alone are not given an unfair opportunity to influence that 
policy.226 Courts' fears would be eliminated if FACA's definitional sec-
tion were changed to state that FACA is not expected to apply to the 
informal, ad hoc conversations that constantly occur between political 
officers and that provide for effective and fluid governmental commu-
nications. FACA should be clarified to apply only when an organized 
group of experts and professionals meet to discuss a preconceived 
agenda whose end result is expected to indirectly or directly influence 
governmental policymaking. 
220 See Gage & Epstein, supra note 17, at 5001l. 
221 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. 
222 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
223 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 440 (1989); North-
west Forest Resource Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009, 1009 (D.D.C. 1994). 
224 Espy, 846 F. Supp at 1009. 
225 See, Markham, supra note 22, at 557; see also Steck testimony, supra note 17, at 347. 
22(; See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
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B. Problems With the Current Judicial Interpretation of FACA 
In the event that the above proposed amendments to FACA do not 
occur, or until they occur, it is up to courts to construe FACA to fulfill 
the goals Congress hoped to achieve in passing FACA. The only ways 
to fulfill the legislative intent behind FACA are for courts to amend 
the current judicial definition of an advisory committee and for courts 
to provide injunctive relief to plaintiffs suing for FACA violations. 
As discussed above, courts have found the statutory definition of 
an advisory committee to be overinclusive and stifling to normal 
governmental process.227 As a result, courts have attempted to limit 
the definition of an advisory committee and have applied FACA only 
when, in their view, the evils FACA was expected to cure are in 
danger of occurring.228 It may be true that the advisory committee 
abuses Congress was seeking to prevent when it passed FACA are 
not in danger of occurring in limited circumstances like those in Pub-
lic Citizen v. United States Department of Justice.229 However, this 
strict, subjective definition of an advisory committee will continue to 
exempt groups which should clearly be subject to FACA, simply 
because a court finds no danger of abuse. The Court in Public Citizen 
should not have searched FACA for explicit congressional intent to 
include the ABA Committee within the definition of an advisory com-
mittee. The language of FACA itself states that FACA applies to all 
groups which are either established or utilized by an executive agency 
or the President.23o In addition, FACA specifically excludes those 
groups to which Congress did not intend FACA to apply.231 Public 
Citizen is an example of the Court broadly denying congressional 
intent simply out of a desire to limit application of a statute on a 
particular set of facts. The Court in Public Citizen was hesitant to 
apply FACA's requirements to the ABA Committee.232 The Court's 
primary concern appeared to be a fear that judicial intrusion into the 
227 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
228 See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text. 
229 Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1989). 
230 FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2). 
231 [d. § 4. In May, 1995, President Clinton signed the so-called "Unfunded Mandates Law." 
Part of the law amends FACA and creates an exemption which allows consultations with 
affected state, local, and tribal governmental officials to be conducted in private. David Hosan-
sky, Provisions: Unfunded Mandates Law, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, 
May 10, 1995 at 1087-88. 
2:<2 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 443-45. 
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President's ability to solicit advice about judicial nominees would 
frustrate the President's constitutional power of appointment.233 In-
stead of broadly limiting FAC.A:s clear and unambiguous definition of 
an advisory committee, the Court either should have deferred to the 
legislature to amend FACA to specifically exclude the ABA Commit-
tee, or limited the case to its facts.234 Instead, the result of Public 
Citizen-selective enforcement of FACA-frustrates the legislative 
intent behind its passage. Instead of applying FACA to any group not 
specifically exempted by statute, which is either established or util-
ized by an executive agency or the President, the Court has created 
a vague and ambiguous result. FACA now only applies when there is 
a subjective danger of advisory committee abuse.235 This is an unclear 
and unworkable definition which gives no guidance to executive agen-
cies as to which advisory groups must be established and conducted 
in compliance with FACA. 
In addition to following FAC.A:s objective definition of an advisory 
committee, courts should follow the lead of the Eleventh Circuit and 
provide injunctive relief for plaintiffs bringing suit for FACA viola-
tions. As discussed above, the court in Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers 
Coalition v. United States Department of Interior enjoined the FWS 
from relying on or utilizing an advisory committee report compiled 
amidst FACA violations.236 
Critics of the Alabama-Tombigbee decision may argue that the 
court rendered a waste all the work the scientific advisory committee 
in Alabama-Tombigbee had done. Critics may also suggest that the 
Alabama-Tombigbee court should have first determined whether the 
report would have been any different had FACA been complied with 
fully, and if not, treat the case as one of harmless error, as the court 
in Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons did.237 Yet, the Alabama-Tom-
bigbee court found that Congress had passed FACA to prevent the 
233 Id. at 443, 467. 
234Id. at 440. In Public Citizen, the Court discusses a previous Supreme Court decision, 
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 844, 896 (1985), quoting Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 
373, 379 (1933), which states that "[w]e cannot press statutory construction 'to the point of 
disingenuous evasion' even to avoid a constitutional question." Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 467. 
Yet, this is exactly what the Court chose to do. See id. As the opinion stated, "[o]ur unwillingness 
to resolve important constitutional questions unnecessarily thus solidifies our conviction that 
FACA is inapplicable." Id. 
235 See id. at 440. 
286 Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Department ofInterior, 26 F.3d 1103, 1105-07 (11th 
Cir. 1994). 
~'7 Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1310 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
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use of any advisory committee as part of the process of making 
important federal agency decisions unless that committee is properly 
established and in compliance with proper procedure.238 The court 
stated that whether or not the panel's report would have been differ-
ent had the committee complied with FACA, was irrelevant.239 The 
court noted that "[e]ven if the panel was scrupulously formed and 
composed of the most fair and impartial scientists around, its meet-
ings and issuance of its report would still run afoul of FACA."240 The 
court accordingly held that since the advisory committee had violated 
FACA, the agency to which the committee reported could not rely on 
the report the committee generated.241 
The Eleventh Circuit's application and enforcement of FACA will 
have a deterrent effect on agencies operating within its jurisdiction. 
If an agency wishes to utilize or rely on any advice rendered by an 
advisory committee, the agency must ensure that the advisory com-
mittee complies with FACA or the agency may subsequently be en-
joined from utilizing any advice the committee provides. 
Although in Alabama-Tombigbee the plaintiff was actually a group 
of businesses rather than an environmental protection group/42 the 
Eleventh Circuit's injunctive remedy will protect both the public and 
the environment from influential private industry involved in the 
committee process.243 By encouraging agency compliance with FACA, 
the Eleventh Circuit is insuring that agencies will insist that their 
advisory committees open their meetings to the public. If the agency 
utilizing the advisory committee is exposed to opposing viewpoints in 
advisory committee reports, there is little doubt that industry domi-
nation will decrease substantially and a pro-environmental viewpoint 
will be heard. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current statutory construction of FACA and its judicial inter-
pretation have left FACA ineffective at carrying out the goals Con-
gress had anticipated FACA would achieve. Amending FACA and 
238 Alabama v. DOI,26 F.3d at 1106. 
239 See id. at 1106-07. 
240 Alabama-Thmbigbee Rivers Coalition v. Fish & Wildlife Serv. of the United States Dep't 
of Interior, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20322 at *3 (N.D. Ala. 1993). 
241 See Alabama v. DOl, 26 F.3d at 1107. 
242 ld. at 1104. 
243 Carson, supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. 
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adopting the Eleventh Circuit practice of ordering injunctive relief in 
suits for FACA violations would cure this deficiency. 
Under the current scheme, there is no incentive for executive agen-
cies, the President, or advisory committees to comply with FACA's 
mandates. FACA was proposed and passed to prevent the evils that 
had been occurring under the weaker, more vague advisory commit-
tee requirements of President Kennedy's Executive Order. Extensive 
testimony throughout the congressional hearings which led to FACA's 
passage confirmed the need for legislative control of advisory commit-
tees to ensure that committees were serving the public interest and 
not promoting selfish private agendas. Under the current judicial 
interpretation of FACA, however, numerous groups which should be 
subject to FACA are excluded and no remedy is available for plaintiffs 
complaining of FACA violations. The current judicial interpretation 
of FACA is not functioning as Congress had intended it to. 
In order for FACA to function as an effective control over advisory 
committee procedures, Congress must amend FACA to clarify its 
ambiguities. Until that occurs, or in the event that Congress does not 
act, courts must broaden their definition of an advisory committee 
and make FACA applicable to any group which fits the current objec-
tive legislative definition of an advisory committee. Courts should 
also follow the lead of the Eleventh Circuit and enjoin executive 
agencies and the President from utilizing or relying on any advice 
or report compiled by a committee in violation of FACA. If courts 
adopted these changes in FACA's interpretation and application, 
courts would achieve Congress's intent in passing FACA. In addition, 
FACA would be a successful way to ensure that an environmental 
viewpoint is brought forth whenever the executive branch utilizes 
advisory committees in the adoption of new governmental policy. 
